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Abstract. Cyber-physical systems come with increasingly complex ar-
chitectures and failure modes, which complicates the task of obtaining
accurate system reliability models. At the same time, with the emergence
of the (industrial) Internet-of-Things, systems are more and more often
being monitored via advanced sensor systems. These sensors produce
large amounts of data about the components’ failure behaviour, and can,
therefore, be fruitfully exploited to learn reliability models automatically.
This paper presents an effective algorithm for learning a prominent class
of reliability models, namely fault trees, from observational data. Our
algorithm is evolutionary in nature; i.e., is an iterative, population-based,
randomized search method among fault-tree structures that are increas-
ingly more consistent with the observational data. We have evaluated our
method on a large number of case studies, both on synthetic data, and
industrial data. Our experiments show that our algorithm outperforms
other methods and provides near-optimal results.
Keywords: fault tree induction · safety-critical systems · cyber-physical
systems · evolutionary algorithm.
1 Introduction
Reliability engineering is an important field that provides methods, tools and
techniques to evaluate and mitigate the risks related to complex systems such as
drones, self-driving cars, production plants, etc. Fault tree analysis is one of the
most prominent technique in this field. It is widely deployed in the automotive,
aerospace and nuclear industry, by companies and institutions like NASA, Ford,
Honeywell, Siemens, the FAA, and many others.
? This research is supported by the Dutch Technology Foundation (STW) under
the Robust CPS program (project 12693), the EU project SUCCESS, the Smart
Industries program (project SEQUOIA 15474), and the Wallenberg AI, Autonomous
Systems and Software Program (WASP) funded by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg
Foundation.
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Fault trees [32] (FTs) belong to analytical techniques for safety, security,
and dependability. They are graphical models that represent how component
failures arise and propagate through the system, leading to system-level failures.
Component failures are modelled in the leaves of the tree as basic events. Fault
tree gates model how combinations of basic events lead to a system failure,
represented by the top event in the FT. The analysis of such FTs [29] is multifold:
they can be used to compute dependability metrics such as system reliability and
availability; understand how systems can fail; identify the best ways to reduce
the risk of system failure, etc. A key bottleneck in fault tree analysis is, however,
the effort needed to construct a faithful fault tree model. FTs are usually built
manually by domain experts. Given the complexity of today’s systems, industrial
FTs often contain thousands of gates. Hence, their construction is a very intricate
task, and also error-prone, since their soundness and completeness largely depends
on domain expertise. With the emergence of the industrial Internet-of-Things,
Cyber-physical systems are more and more equipped with smart sensor systems,
monitoring whether a system component is in a failed state or not. Even though
such a monitoring system is often designed to detect failures during operations,
their data can be very fruitfully deployed to learn reliability models. Such data
can be crucial for the engineers to build an FT [14]. Recent work focused on
learning FTs from observational data, identifying causalities from data [25].
In this paper, we focus on FT generation from data, using an evolutionary
algorithm (EA). EAs approximate stochastic learning by mimicking biological
evolution, and have been successfully applied to a wide plethora of applications;
examples include the scheduling of flexible manufacturing systems [11], automata
learning [10], induction of Boolean functions [28], and many more. In our case,
each stage of the EA keeps a population of candidate FTs. New fault trees are
generated by mimicking biological evolution. That is, new FTs are created by
reproduction (e.g., adding or deleting FT gates), crossover (e.g. swapping FT
branches), and mutation (e.g. changing an AND gate into an OR gate). In total,
we have identified seven (parametric) generation rules, which are equally applied.
Finally, we select the new population by only keeping those FTs with the best
fitness, i.e. FTs that best fit to the observational data. We have experimentally
verified the applicability of our algorithm, on synthetic data, an industrial
case study, and a benchmark of FTs previously studied in the literature. Our
experiments show that the algorithm is fast and accurate (> 99%). Further, we
have investigated the robustness of our method to noisy data. Here we found
that our EA handles noisy records. We also developed a variation of our EA in
order to take expert knowledge into account. When domain experts partially
know the structure of the FT, then the task is reduced to evolve sub-Fault Trees,
given the known skeleton of the FT.
Being a first step, our algorithm focuses on static fault trees, featuring only
Boolean gates. An important topic for future work is the extension to dynamic
fault trees. These come with additional gates, catering for common dependability
patterns like spare management and functional dependencies. Static fault trees,
however, have appeal as relatively simple yet powerful formalism and are often
used in practice. Furthermore, dynamic fault trees strongly depend on the
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temporal order in which failures occur, and their learning will, therefore, require
more complex data, such as time series.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 review related work on
learning FTs from data as well as preliminary definitions. We present then in
Section 4 our technique to infer an FT using an EA. In Section 5, the variation
of our EA that takes expert knowledge into account. In Section 6, we show the
results we achieved. Finally, we discuss and conclude about further research.
2 Related Work
Related work on learning fault trees spans three areas of research: the synthesis
of fault trees from other graphical models of the system under study; recent work
on the generation of fault trees from observational data describing the system;
and, since fault trees are in essence Boolean functions, literature on learning
Boolean functions from observational data.
Model-based synthesis. While state-of-the-art fault tree design is often performed
manually by domain specialists [15], several methods have been proposed to
synthesize FTs automatically from other models of the system [3, 30]. Thus,
these methods require the pre-construction of a system model in a suitable
model description language, which varies with each method for FT synthesis.
For example, the HiP-HOPS framework [27] synthesizes an FT from a system
model describing transactions among the system components, annotated with
failure information. Similar synthesis methods were developed from the AltaRica
system description language, which models the causal relations between system
variables and events using transitions [20]. Specific system control models in
the form of directed graphs have also been shown to suit the synthesis of fault
trees [1, 12], as well as Go models [33]. Furthermore, system models described
in the model language NuSMV also enable the synthesis of FTs. A limitation
of this method is, however, the fact that the resulting FTs show the relation
between top events and basic events, but do not show how failure propagates in
the system via system components [4]. Static FTs can also be synthesized from
models in the Architectural Analysis and Design Language AADL [21].
As a special case, FT generation has been attempted so that the learning
method includes explicit reasoning about the causal relations between events
in the system. For this type of FT generation, [18] requires a probabilistic
system model, from which a model-checking step obtains a set of probabilistic
counterexamples. When the system is concurrent, the order of events in these
counterexamples does not necessarily signify causality, so logical combinations of
events are separately validated for causality. Similarly, in [22] a cause-effect graph
(and from that, an FT) is extracted by model checking a process already modelled
by a finite-state machine, against safety and liveness requirements, using failure
injection. Since model-based FT learning requires prior modelling of the system
under study, these methods do not adapt well in applications where the systems
evolve and thus need to be remodelled, e.g., components are replaced, or the
interactions between components change, thus changing the failure modes and
their probability of occurrence.
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Learning causal models from data. Supervised automated learning of dependability
models using system data, unlike the model-based methods described above, will
adapt to system change, under the assumption that all the system components
remain monitored by sensors throughout their lifetime, also after a change
of components. Here, we take “learning” to mean broadly any autonomous
computational intelligence method able to infer (or even approximate) high-level
models of knowledge from data. Causal Bayesian Networks [19] are standard
graphical models which have been learnt from data examples. These models have
straightforward translations into FTs, but are themselves NP-hard or require
exponential time to synthesize accurately [8, 16]. These networks will model
a limited form of causality, namely global causal relationships, rather than a
sequence of causal relationships among events local to the components of a system.
LIFT [25] is a recent approach for learning static FTs with Boolean event
variables, n-ary AND/OR gates, annotated with event failure probabilities. The
input to the algorithm is untimed observational data, i.e., a dataset where each
row is a single observation over the entire system, and each column records the
value of a system event. All intermediate events to be included in the FT must be
present in the dataset, but not all may be needed in the FT, and a small amount
of noise in the dataset can be tolerated. LIFT also includes a causal validation
step (the Mantel-Haenszel statistical test) to filter for the most likely causal
relationships among system events, but the worst-case complexity is exponential
in the number of system events in the data. Its main advantage is that of being
one of the few automated FT-learning methods which validate causality.
Learning Boolean formulas and classifiers from data. Before LIFT, observational
data were used to generate FTs with the IFT algorithm [24] based on standard
decision-tree statistical learning. The advantage of learning a graphical decision
tree out of data is the inherent interpretability of decision-tree models and their
ease of translation into other graphical models. Boolean formulas or networks
were also machine-learnt using a similar tree-based method [16,26]. The classic
C4.5 learning algorithm yields a Boolean decision tree that is easily translatable
into a Boolean formula by constructing the conjunction of all paths leading
to a leaf modelling a True value (i.e., system failure), and then simplifying
the Boolean function. The resulting models encode the same information as a
decision tree (i.e., a classifier for the observational data), so lack the validation
of causal relations, but are expected to preserve their predictive power about
the system. This retained our attention: indeed, static FTs (in opposition to
dynamic FTs, where time-dependence of events is considered) can be seen as
Boolean functions. Furthermore, Boolean formulas were also machine-learnt using
black-box classifiers (namely, classifiers not easily interpretable as a graphical
model). Such methods include SVMs, Logistic Regression and Naive Bayes.
We propose a novel algorithm to learn an FT that best (most accurately)
classifies records in a tabular dataset composed of observational tuples, in which
values (failures) for each Boolean basic event and Boolean top event in the system
are known. We compare it with these existing learning algorithm, in terms of its
performance when fitting data and robustness to noisy data.
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3 Background
In this section, we first define the structure of a static FT (consisting of logic
gates, and also of intermediate events) and a dataset from which an FT is then
inferred. The formulations below follow definitions from [25].
FTs [32] are trees that model how component failures propagate to system
failures. Since subtrees can be shared, FTs are in fact directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs) rather than trees. Essentially, intermediate events in the FT are logical
combinations of other intermediate events, with only basic events (BE) as the
leaves of the tree, and one special intermediate event called the top event as root.
Gates model how BE failures lead to system failures. Standard fault trees feature
two types of gates: AND, and OR.
Definition 1. A gate G is a tuple (t, I, O) such that:
– t is the type of G with t ∈ {And, Or}.
– I is a set of n ≥ 2 intermediate events {i1, . . . , in} that are inputs of G.
– O is the intermediate event that is the output of G.
We denote by I(G) the set of intermediate events in the input of G and by
O(G) the intermediate event in the output of G.
Definition 2. An AND gate is a gate (And, I, O) where output O occurs (i.e.
O is True) if and only if every i ∈ I occurs.
Definition 3. An OR gate is a gate (Or, I, O) where output O occurs (i.e. O
is True) if and only if at least one i ∈ I occurs.
Definition 2 requires that all system components modelled by the events in
the input of the AND gate must fail in order for the system modelled by the
event in the output to fail. Similarly, Definition 3 requires that one of the system
components modelled by the events in the input of the OR gate must fail in
order for the system modelled by the event in the output to fail.
Definition 4. A basic event B is an event with no input and one intermediate
event as output. We denote by O(B) the intermediate event in the output of B.
Sometimes other gates are considered, like the XOR (exclusive OR), the
voting gate and the NOT gate [17,32]. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the
AND and OR gates; other gates can be treated in a similar fashion. The root of
the tree is called the top event (T). The top event represents the failure condition
of interest, such as the stranding of a train, or the unplanned unavailability of a
satellite. Thus, a FT fails if its top event fails.
Definition 5. A fault tree F is a tuple (BE, IE, T,G) where:
– BE is the set of basic events; O(B) ∈ IE, ∀B ∈ BE. A basic event may be
annotated with a probability of occurrence p.
– IE is the set of intermediate events.
– T is the top event, T ∈ IE.
– G is the set of gates; I(G) ⊂ IE ∪BE, O(G) ∈ IE, ∀G ∈ G.
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– The graph formed by G should be connected and acyclic, with the top event
T as unique root.
We denote by IE(F) the set of intermediate events in F and by IE(G) the
intermediate event corresponding to gate G.
Lamp Failure (T)
Button Failure
OF CF
Battery Failure
LB I LB II
(a) Example Fault Tree.
OF CF LB I LB II T count
0 0 0 0 0 900
0 0 0 1 0 15
0 0 1 0 0 5
0 0 1 1 1 25
0 1 0 1 1 5
0 1 1 0 1 5
1 0 0 0 1 35
1 0 1 0 1 5
1 1 0 0 1 3
1 1 1 0 1 2
(b) Example dataset.
Fig. 1. Example of Fault Tree and learning dataset.
We now define a data format from which we learn an FT, as a collection of records.
Each record is a valuation for the set of BEs (variable that models the state
of one basic, indivisible system component), indicating whether a failure was
observed for that BE. We assume that our dataset is labeled, i.e., also indicates
whether the top event T has failed, yielding the predicted outcome of the FT.
Definition 6. A record R over the set of variables V is a list of length |V|
containing tuples [(Vi, vi)], 1 ≤ i ≤ |V| where Vi is a variable, Vi ∈ V and vi is a
Boolean value of Vi.
Definition 7. A dataset D is a set of |D| records, all over the same set of
variables V. Each variable in V forms a column in D, and each record forms a
row. When k identical records are present in D, a single such record is shown,
with a new count column for the value k.
Fig. 1a shows a FT modeling a lamp failure. The top OR-gate shows that
a lamp fails if there is either a button failure or a battery failure. A button
failure happens if either an operator (OF) or a cable (CF) fails. The AND-gate
indicates that battery failure happens if both batteries are low (LB I and LB
II). Table 1b shows a corresponding dataset.
4 Learning Fault Trees with Nature-Inspired Stochastic
Optimization
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) were among the earliest artificial intelligence
methods, first envisioned by Alan Turing in 1950 [31]. EAs are heuristics that
mimic biological evolution: one starts with an initial population, and iteratively
generates new individuals through modification and recombination, where only
the best individuals are kept in the next generation – mimicking survival of
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the fittest. EAs are particularly suitable to automatically learn models of some
kind, such as trees, graphs or matrix structures, free-form equations, sets and
permutations, and synthetic computer programs, etc. Evolutionary algorithms
have been very successfully applied in several domains, ranging from antenna
designs for spacecrafts [13], graph-like network topologies [5] and matrix-like
robot designs [7].
The main challenges in devising EAs are (a) formalizing what is a syntactically
correct solution to the problem (in our case, a well-formed fault tree), and (b)
formalizing what makes, semantically, a solution better than another, i.e., writing
a fitness function which takes any proposed solution and returns a numerical
“goodness” for that solution. In our case, we want the fault tree to be consistent
with the observational data. Hence the fitness function is the proportion of
records correctly classified. Then, the EA will aim to maximize the fitness as
close as possible to its optimal value of 100%. The EA consists of an iterative
optimization process, which maintains a population of candidate solutions at each
iteration, and randomly mutates and combines (i.e., applies genetic operators
to) solutions from a population, such that the fitness of the best solution per
population improves in time.
1. Initialization: The initial population contains two simple FTs; all variables in
the input dataset D are represented as BEs in these FTs.
2. Mutation and recombination: Genetic operations are performed on the FTs
and generate new FTs.
3. Evaluation: The fitness of each new FT is evaluated.
4. Selection: High-fitness FTs from the new generation replace low-fitness FTs
from the previous generation.
5. Termination: Steps 2 to 4 are repeated until a given termination criterion is
met. This can be if at least one solution in the population exceeds a given
fitness bound, or if a given maximum number of iterations is reached. Upon
termination, the best solution or solutions in the population are returned.
We describe these steps in more detail below.
4.1 Initialization
Our EA takes as input a dataset D and aims at computing an FT with maximal
fitness to this dataset. The dataset yields the set of BEs, as well as the top level
event T . We start with an initial population consisting of the following two FTs,
where all BEs are connected to T via an AND and an OR gate respectively F1
= (BE, {T}, T, {(And,BE, T )}) and F2 = (BE, {T}, T, {(Or,BE, T )}), where
BE ∪ {T} = V, so all the basic events and the top event must be in the dataset
D. These two FTs are the simplest structures including all the observational
variables in the data, with an AND gate and an OR gate, respectively, at the top
of the FT, and all BEs as inputs of this gate. These two individuals act as a seed
population; later populations are larger in size. The population size is a setting
depending on the nature of the FT to learn (namely, the number of BEs). Since
the time complexity of the algorithm depends on the population size, increasing
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the population size may lead to scalability issues. It has also been shown in [6]
that increasing the population size does not always perform as well as expected.
In our experiments, we limit the population to hundreds of FTs.
4.2 Mutation and recombination
We define seven stochastic genetic operators (one binary and six unary) which
apply to FTs. For each iteration, each of the genetic operators operates on all
individuals in the population with a given probability, to create new individuals.
The order in which they are applied is randomized at each iteration. All our
operators are illustrated by Fig. 5 to 11.
G-create. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), create a gate G 6∈ G, randomly
select its nature (AND or OR), then randomly select a gate G′ ∈ G. Randomly
select inputs events I ′ of I(G′) to become inputs of G such that I(G) = I ′
and I(G′) = I(G′) \ I ′. Then, add O(G) to the input events of G′ such that
I(G′) = I(G′) ∪ O(G). The new FT is F = (BE, IE ∪ O(G), T,G ∪ {G}) with
G 6∈ G. This operator is illustrated in Fig. 5.
G-mutate. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), randomly select a gate
G ∈ G and change its nature (AND to OR, or OR to AND). This operator is
illustrated in Fig. 6.
G-delete. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), randomly select a gate G ∈ G
such that O(G) 6= T and delete it. We set then, I(Gp) =
⋃
i∈I(G)
IEi such that
O(G) ∈ Gp. The new FT is F = (BE, IE \O(G), T,G \ {G}). This operator is
illustrated in Fig. 7.
BE-disconnect. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G) and a randomly chosen
basic event B ∈ BE, disconnect B from its intermediate event G = O(B). The
new FT if F = (BE \ {B}, IE, T,G), where B 6∈ I(G).
Note here that a gate G left with 0 or 1 input will not be removed: this is
to preserve the solution search space and enable the connection of BEs to this
gate. Only the genetic operator G-delete can remove such a gate. This operator
is illustrated in Fig. 8.
BE-connect. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G) and a basic event B 6∈ BE
and B ∈ V \ T , randomly choose a gate G ∈ G and connect B to the input of
G. The new FT is F = (BE ∪ {B}, IE, T,G), where B ∈ I(G). This operator
is illustrated in Fig. 9. Note that this operator is essentially the inverse of BE-
disconnect. The relevance of this operator lies in the fact that some FTs in the
population may not contain as many BEs as variables V in the dataset. Also,
our definition of this operator implies that no BE will be input to 2 different
gates. However, the connection of the same BE to 2 different gates can occur
within a crossover operation.
BE-swap. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G) and a randomly chosen basic
event B ∈ BE and a randomly chosen gate G ∈ G \ O(B), disconnect B from
O(B) and connect B to G. This operator is illustrated in Fig. 10.
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Crossover. The crossover operator takes two FTs as input and swaps at random
two of their subtrees. This leads to two new FTs, where the first fault tree
contains the selected subtree of the second fault tree and vice versa. More
precisely, one selects at random an intermediate event IE1 ∈ IE1 from the first
fault tree F1, and one also selects at random an intermediate event IE2 ∈ IE2
from the section fault tree. Then one replaces in F1 the subtree under IE1 by
the subtree under IE2. Similarly, one replaces in F2 the subtree under IE2 by
the subtree under IE1. Given two input FTs F1 = (BE1, IE1, T1,G1) and F2 =
(BE2, IE2, T2,G2), randomly select an IE1 ∈ IE1 and IE2 ∈ IE2. Then, we set
I(O(IE1)) = I(O(IE1)) \ IE1 ∪ IE2 and I(O(IE2)) = I(O(IE2)) \ IE2 ∪ IE1.
Finally, O(IE1) = O(IE2) and vice versa. This operator is shown in Fig. 11.
Note that in this example, the resulting child in Fig. 11d contains a BE (BE3)
connected to multiple gates.
4.3 Evaluation
We define the fitness of an FT as the number of records in the dataset for which
the value of the top event, given the values of the BEs, is correctly computed.
The count of a record, i.e. the number of appearances, give more weight in the
fitness function to records that occur often. In this way, noisy data can be better
handled, which often happen in real life applications.
Definition 8. The fitness of a fault tree is its accuracy w.r.t. the dataset D s.t.
f =
∑
r∈D
x∑
r∈D
k
where
{
x = k if V [T ] = P [T ]
x = 0 otherwise
where P [T ] stands for the predicted value of the top event given the dataset D for
a given FT, V [T ] the real value of the top event and k the number of occurrences
of the record r.
4.4 Selection
The selection strategy of the best individuals to undergo genetic operations
is essential to increase the improvement rate of the fitness of the population.
Commonly used strategies are roulette wheel, stochastic universal sampling,
tournament and random selections. In all our experiments, we use an elitist
strategy. The nature of the individuals motivates this choice: best-fitted FTs are
the closest in the population to the optimal solution. They consist of Boolean
gates and BEs, which means that a least fitted solution needs more genetic
operations to become optimal. We thus hope that mutating the best FTs will be
less costly in terms of iterations of the EA in order to converge towards the right
solution. In Appendix B, we conducted an experiment justifying the relevance of
elitism, where we make a comparison between different selection strategies.
4.5 Termination
The decision of whether to return the best FTs in the actual population or
to continue the evolutionary process follows the termination criteria. In our
experiments, we used the standard termination criteria, which are:
10 A. Linard et al.
1. at least one solution in the population achieves an accuracy of 1, which means
a perfect fitness to the data.
2. a maximum number of allowed iterations is reached.
3. convergence: no improvement of the best FT in the population has been
observed for a given number of iterations.
Note that several runs of our EA may return different FTs with the same
fitness, especially in terms of structure. Indeed, two FTs with a different structure
may be semantically equivalent. We show in Fig. 14 how an equivalent FT to a
target FT is learnt by our EA. Indeed, FTs, like Boolean formulas, can be factor-
ized to Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF, where a Boolean formula is standardized
as a disjunction of conjunctive clauses) or to Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF,
where a Boolean formula is standardized as a conjunction of disjunctive clauses).
As a result, it may happen that all variables in the dataset do not appear in the
FT since they are either not needed or not relevant. In our experiments, we chose
to compute the CNF of the best-fitted FT. The transformation of an FT into a
CNF is based on the following rules: the double negative law, De Morgan’s laws,
and the distributive law.
5 Learning of Partial Fault Trees
A fruitful application of learning fault trees is the learning of partial models, where
domain experts partially know the structure of the FT, and other parts need to
be inferred from data. In this way expert knowledge and data-driven approaches
are aggregated. To accommodate this approach, we propose here a variation of
our EA. We parameterize our EA with such a partially known structure as input
to the algorithm. The task for the EA is then to evolve sub-Fault Trees, given
the known skeleton of the FT. The initial population becomes then the partial
structures given as input. Genetic operators are slightly modified to ensure the
given skeletons to remain unmodified in each mutated FT. We gather at any
moment of the evolutionary process a population composed of FTs containing
the allowed skeleton. In this section, we detail the initialization and the genetic
operators to take into account the expert knowledge provided as a skeleton FT.
5.1 Initialization
In the same way as the procedure described in Sect. 4, our evolutionary algorithm
takes as input a dataset D, as well a known FT-skeleton Fo. We start then with
an initial population consisting of this FT-skeleton:
Fo = (BEo, IEo, To,Go)
where BEo are BEs contained in the skeleton, IEo are the intermediate events
of the skeleton, To is the top event of the skeleton and Go is the set of gates
contained in the skeleton.
This is this structure given as input that will remain in all mutated FTs all
along the evolutionary process.
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5.2 Mutation and recombination
In order to preserve the FT-skeleton during mutation and recombination opera-
tions, we have to adapt the following genetic operators.
G-create-o. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), create a gate G 6∈ G,
randomly select its nature (AND or OR), then randomly select a gate G′ ∈ G.
Randomly select inputs events I ′ of I(G′) \ IEo to become inputs of G such that
I(G) = I ′ and I(G′) = I(G′) \ I ′. Then, add O(G) to the input events of G′ such
that I(G′) = I(G′)∪O(G). The new FT is F = (BE, IE∪O(G), T,G∪{G}) with
G 6∈ G. In that way, we allow the creation of a gate such that its input events
are not in the gates of the skeleton, that is, the skeleton remains unchanged.
G-mutate-o. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), randomly select a gate
G ∈ G \Go and change its nature (AND to OR, or OR to AND).
G-delete-o. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), randomly select a gate
G ∈ G \Go such that O(G) 6= T and delete it. We set then, I(Gp) =
⋃
i∈I(G)
IEi
such that O(G) ∈ Gp.
BE-disconnect-o. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G) and a randomly chosen
basic event B ∈ BE \BEo, disconnect B from its intermediate event G = O(B).
The new FT if F = (BE \ {B}, IE, T,G), where B 6∈ I(G).
BE-swap-o. Given the input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G) and a randomly chosen
basic event B ∈ BE\BEo and a randomly chosen gate G ∈ G\O(B), disconnect
B from O(B) and connect B to G. This operator is illustrated in Fig. 10.
Crossover-o. Given two input FTs F1 = (BE1, IE1, T1,G1) and F2 = (BE2, IE2
, T2,G2), randomly select an IE1 ∈ IE1 \ IEo and IE2 ∈ IE2 \ IEo. Then, we
set I(O(IE1)) = I(O(IE1))\IE1∪IE2 and I(O(IE2)) = I(O(IE2))\IE2∪IE1.
Finally, O(IE1) = O(IE2) and vice versa.
Note that the scenario where expert guidance is used to lead to faster conver-
gence of the FT learning algorithm is realistic: indeed, this variation is helpful to
refine existing FTs, or checking if a handmade model is accurate given real-world
measurements.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We have evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of our EA method using a large
number of cases. We compared our methods with six other learning techniques:
five approaches from the literature, and the variant of our own EA technique for
learning partial fault trees. For these methods, we investigated both the accuracy
and as well as runtime. Our comparisons were performed for a set of synthetic
cases (Sections 6.2 and 6.3), as well as for industrial benchmarks (Section 6.4
and 6.5).
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6.1 Experimental set up
The first three methods in our evaluation are: (1) Support Vector Machine
(abbreviated svm in the figures), (2) Logistic Regression (abbreviated log) and (3)
Naive Bayes Classifier (nba). These methods are Boolean classifiers that, given
the values of the BEs, predict the value of the top event T . Being classifiers,
methods (1) - (3) do not yield FT models, only a prediction for the value of T .
Then, we have used three methods that do learn fault tree models: (4) We have
compared our results to the well-known C4.5 algorithm for learning decision trees
(abbreviated c45). Decision trees can be transformed to FTs, by first computing
in the decision tree the conjunction of all paths leading to failure leaves, and then
simplifying the conjunction to CNF. (5) We have also compared to the earlier
LIFT approach, which re returns an FT. (6) Finally, we used the variation of the
EA for learning partial fault trees (ea-p). Here, we assumed that the two upper
layers of the fault trees were fixed.
To compare these methods, the observational data was divided into two sets:
one training set, used as input to the EA (with an average of 2/3 of all possible
observations), and a test set containing all observational variables (complete
boolean table), used to evaluate the solution returned by our algorithms. The
parameters of the EA were set as follows: we used a population size of 100. As
termination criteria, we used either a maximum number of 100 iterations or an
observed convergence (i.e. no improvement of the best individual’s fitness) over
10 iterations or an FT with fitness 1 (optimal solution) in the population. Each
genetic operator was applied with probability 0.9 in order to increase the mutation
rate of the population. The selection and replacement strategy were elitists, to
systematically replace least-fitted individuals in the old population by the best
individuals in the union of the old population and the set of newly generated
individuals. Finally, to homogenize several runs of the EA, the conjunctive
normal form (CNF) of the best FT was returned in the termination step. Note
that our Python implementations and dataset are available4, and that we used
state-of-the-art implementations of the scikit-learn library for techniques (1)-(5).
6.2 Synthetic Dataset: accuracy and runtime
We have first used a large synthetic case. We considered 100 randomly generated
fault trees with 6 to 15 BEs, and for each FT, a randomly generated data set, with
200 to 230k records. Figures 2a and 2b present respectively the average accuracy
and the average runtime, both as functions of the number of BEs. Fig. 2a shows
that the svm and c45 methods have the highest accuracy. However, the svm
method only provides a classifier, not a fault tree. Further, the c45 method does
not perform well in terms of runtime, see Fig 2b. Our methods EA and EA-p
perform reasonably well in terms of accuracy, as well as in term of run time.
Finally, the log and nba method are fast but provide low accuracy. We also see
that LIFT obtains less good results. An exponential complexity can explain this,
and the fact LIFT requires data about intermediate events.
4 https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/alinard/learning-ft
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Fig. 2. Comparison of different learning algorithms.
We can also see that the more the FTs contain BEs, the more it is complicated
to gather a solution with perfect fitness w.r.t. the training set. This is due to the
significant number of iterations needed to converge to an optimal solution when
dealing with a large number of BEs. However, we can see that expert knowledge
is extremely beneficial in the case of ea-p, where the skeleton of the FT is given.
It enables us to learn more accurate FTs (accuracy > 95%) and faster (up to 10
times faster than the baseline EA).
6.3 Synthetic Dataset: other statistics
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Fig. 3. Statistics on genetic algorithm.
We also carried out an experiment where noise is added in the dataset, in
order to test the robustness of the different algorithms. The noise varies from 0
to 5% of noisy records. We call a noisy record one where the value of at least one
variable has been changed, i.e. measured incorrectly in real life. In the results
shown in Fig. 3a, we see that our methods are relatively robust against noise
compared to other methods. However, we see that the accuracy of the learned
FTs drops whenever noise is present in the dataset.
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Further, we also investigated which genetic operations were successful, as a
function of the number of iterations, shown in Fig. 3b). The latter is computed
by looking at, for each iteration, the number of individuals issued from the
same genetic operator who survived in the next generation, i.e. whose fitness
was good enough to be kept in the population. We see that the success of most
operations depends on the stage of the EA: this is the case for BE-disconnect,
and G-create, which provide satisfying new individuals during the first iterations
of the algorithm. An explanation is that G-create will increase the size of the
FT, i.e. its complexity. Then, the search space of the solution is increased. In
opposition to these gates, G-mutate seems to be a less good operator since the
number of individuals issued from it tends not to survive in the population. This
is mainly due to the change of semantics this operator implies: indeed, when the
depth of the mutated gate is small (i.e. close to the top event), the meaning of
the resulting FT may drastically change. Hence a small number of successful
operations of this type.
6.4 Case Study with Industrial Dataset
We present here an industrial case study based on the dataset from [23]. We
consider here a component called the nozzle. The system containing the nozzles
records large amounts of data about the state of the components over time, among
them the failing of nozzles and nozzle-related factors. The dataset is composed
of 9,000 records, 8 basic events being nozzles-related factors and a Boolean top
event, standing for nozzle failure. We ran our genetic algorithm 10 times, with a
maximum allowed iterations of 100 (convergence criterion of 10), and the fitness
of the best FT learnt was of 0.997 (split ratio for train/test set of 80/20). The
resulting FT, shown in Fig. 13, has been validated by domain experts. Even
in a practical context, multiple runs of the EA may return different (possibly
equivalent) FTs, with different structures. Depending on the applications, expert
knowledge can figure out whether one or the other returned FT is the most
relevant to the case study. To help the selection process, one can place additional
constraints on the FT, such as the number of children.
6.5 Fault Tree Benchmark
We present here the results we obtained for a set of publicly available benchmark
suite5, consisting of industrial fault trees from the literature, containing from 6
to 14 BEs and 4 to 10 gates. The FTs used are Cardiac Assist System (CAS),
Container Seal Design Example (CSD), Multiprocessor Computing System (MCS),
Monopropellant Propulsion System (MPS), Pressure Tank (PT), Sensor Filter
Network (SF14) and Spread Mooring System (SMS A1). Whereas the fault tree
models were given in the literature, no data sets were available. Therefore, we have
randomly generated these data sets, containing 10M records per case, in order to
cope with low failure rates. Since the benchmark does provide failure probabilities
per BEs, we have used those probabilities: If pe is the failure probability of BE e
5 https://dftbenchmarks.utwente.nl/
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Fig. 4. Results of Fault Tree Benchmark.
in the benchmark, then we set, in each data record, R[e] = 1 with probability
pe. Fig. 4a and 4b present the accuracy and runtime, respectively. Missing bars
stand for experiments for which no result could have been obtained within 1 week
of running time. We can see that for all case studies, our method is either the
most or the second most efficient. We also see that in all cases, our method is
among the most accurate methods.
7 Discussion
Extensions. The definition of gates and genetic operators can be extended. We
show how to deal with K/N gates, which are gates of type (k/N, I, O) where
output O occurs (i.e. O is True) if at least k input events i ∈ I occurs, with
|I| = N . The cardinality of a k/N gate is said to be the number k. Note
that this gate can be replaced by the OR of all sets of k inputs, but the use
of k/N gates is much more compact for the representation of a FT. We can
then define new genetic operators, such as k-n-change where, given an input
FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), randomly select a k/N gate G ∈ G and change its
cardinality, such that k ∈ [1, N − 1]. We also extend the mutate gate operator of
G-mutate, as follows: Given an input FT F = (BE, IE, T,G), randomly select
a gate G ∈ G and change its nature (AND to OR or k/N ; OR to AND or
k/N ; k/N to OR or AND). Similarly, we can redefine the create gate operator
C-create such that the randomly selected nature of the new gate is chosen
among AND, OR or k/N .
Our formalism can also handle NOT gates so that the FTs can become non-
monotonic.
Limitations. While we can accurately learn small fault trees, the main limitation
of our method at the moment is scalability. While other techniques, especially
naive Bayesian classifiers, score well, techniques that learn models experience
slower performance. Therefore, a solution may be to combine both methods. We
can also use better heuristics on which GO to deploy, and with what parameters.
Such ideas were also the key to the success of EAs in other application domains.
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The result obtained by the EA does not ensure a perfect fitness of the FT with
regards to the data. This is the case when a maximal number of iteration has been
reached, and the best FT in the population returned. Hence the near-optimality
of our algorithm. In addition, multiple runs of the EA may return different
(possibly equivalent) FTs, with different structures. We leave for further work the
discovery of which of the returned FT is right, based on the data, figuring out
causal relationships between variables using Mantel-Haenszel Partial Association
score [2]. Another limitation lies in the growing size of the FTs after iterations: this
may lead to overgrown FTs. However, we think that the best fit individuals may
be compacted when returned: indeed, some gates in the FTs may contain none
of only one input, and some factorization can be applied. We thus recommend
performing FT reduction on the returned FTs, such as the calculation of CNFs
or DNFs. A first alternative would be to reduce to CNF or DNF the FTs in the
population at each iteration of the EA. However, this would drastically reduce
the search space of the EA (e.g. by making fewer mutations/recombinations
possible, hence leading to a lower fitness) and go against genetic programming
principles. A second alternative would be to take into account the size of the
solutions as a second fitness function for the selection step. The implementation
of such a multi-objective EA [9] is left for further work.
In all cases, learning FTs from an already known skeleton FT may suffer less from
overgrown FTs after several iterations: the skeleton may give, indeed, already
enough information on the structure of the FT. Thus, it helps the algorithm to
converge faster to a solution.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented an evolutionary algorithm for the automated generation of FTs
from Boolean observational data. We defined a set of genetic operators specific
to the formalism of FTs. Our results show the robustness and scalability of our
algorithm. Our future research will focus on the learning of dynamic FTs, and
especially trying to learn their specific gates such as PAND, FDEP and SPARE
gates. We will also further look into Bayesian Inference and translating rules
from Bayesian Networks to FTs. We also hope to take into account different
failure modes of components thanks to INHIBIT gates. Finally, since there are
many possible (i.e. logically equivalent) alternatives to an FT, we would like
to investigate further what are the features of a good FT. In other words, we
think that we need to characterize how much better a particular FT structure is
compared to another.
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A Illustrated Genetic Operators
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Fig. 5. Example of G-create.
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Fig. 6. Example of G-mutate: mutating gate G1 into an OR gate.
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Fig. 7. Example of G-delete: deleting gate G.
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Fig. 8. Disconnecting basic event B4 from a FT.
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Fig. 9. Example of BE-connect : connecting B4 to a FT.
T
G
B2 B3 B4
B1
T
G
B2 B3
B1 B4
Fig. 10. Example of BE-swap: swapping basic event B4 from gate G to gate T .
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Fig. 11. Example of crossover between (a) and (b) and resulting children (c and d).
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B Selection Strategies
In this section, we compare different selections strategies for our evolutionary
algorithms:
– Elitism: systematically selects the best fitted individuals. This guarantees
that the solution quality obtained by the EA will not decrease from one
generation to the next.
– Roulette wheel Selection: also known as fitness proportionate selection, indi-
viduals in the population will be selected proportional to their fitnesses.
– Stochastic Universal Sampling (SUS): chooses several individuals from the
population by repeated random sampling, and uses a single random value
to sample all of the individuals by choosing them at evenly spaced intervals.
This allows least fitted individuals to be selected.
– Tournament Selection: involves running several “tournaments” among a
few individuals chosen at random from the population. The winner of each
tournament (i.e. the individual with the best fitness) is selected.
– Random Selection: the FTs are randomly selected in the population.
0 20 40 60 80
iteration
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
ac
cu
ra
cy
elitist
roulette wheel 
SUS
tournament
random
(a) Average FT accuracy during the EA.
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Fig. 12. Comparison of different selection strategies.
The results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 12. We show in Fig. 12a how
the accuracy of the best FT in the population evolves through iterations. In Fig.
12b, we show the average FT accuracy obtained as a function of the number of
BEs in the FT. These results show that the elitist strategy leads to the highest
FT accuracy, and to the fastest convergence.
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C Industrial Case Study
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Fig. 13. Fault Tree for the nozzle case study learned by our evolutionary algorithm.
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D DNF of Fault Trees
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Fig. 14. Fault Trees may have different equivalent forms.
